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This paper describes changes in local environmental governance through the framework of 
governance. Governance literature states that policy making has moved from a centralized 
governmental process to an open negotiation involving various actors from both public and 
private sectors. The changes affect both the decision-making processes and policy focus, 
as measured by the issue areas included. The analysis is based on the City of Helsinki. The 
data used consists of 75 interviews with organizational representatives, as well as archi-
val data. Descriptive measures of social network analysis are used to describe the links 
between the network and the policy decisions.
Introduction
The framework of traditional political science 
focuses on government and the distribution of 
power. Numerous alternative governance theo-
ries have emerged, which place the locus of 
attention on decision-making processes and the 
aggregation of information (Kooiman 1993, 
2003, Rhodes 1996, Pierre and Peters 2005) 
Communication network structures in particu-
lar are deemed important determinants for out-
comes in collective decision-making processes 
(van Kersbergen and van Waarden 2004). The 
governance theory or framework also highlights 
the multiple levels of government in competi-
tion with each other, in which there is no clear 
hierarchy (Bache and Flinders 2004). The aim of 
this paper is to apply the governance framework 
to a descriptive analysis of local environmental 
policy-making. The question is, does a descrip-
tion of the networks explain policy choice?
An empirical analysis based on data concern-
ing Helsinki aims to demonstrate those features 
of policy-making processes in modern societies 
that do not conform to the traditional separa-
tion of governmental powers into the spheres 
of legislative, executive, and judicial. Instead of 
a central legislative body, such as a parliament 
in the national context, or a city council in the 
local context, decisions are made by networks 
of organizations. The same holds true for the 
executive powers in the city government or the 
city board, or the judicial power of various legal 
bodies, as both the execution and monitoring of 
the selected policies are entrusted to the same 
network of organizations.
These concepts are explored through features 
of the environmental decision-making process in 
the City of Helsinki, where policy making is a 
result a pluricentric, interorganizational process. 
The government itself is not a unifi ed body, but a 
collection of institutions with their own histories, 
and most importantly, preferences and objectives 
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that may contradict those of other governmental 
agencies. As the complexity of the problems 
necessitates the inclusion of private actors in the 
decision-making process, the number of confl ict-
ing interests involved grows even larger.
The policy process is continuous and com-
plex. The types of policy instruments available 
usually lead towards choices that the executive 
body cannot unilaterally supervise or enforce 
and the same organizational network has to be 
activated and involved in determining policy 
compliance and success. In environmental 
policy, decision on the best available technolo-
gies are one example in which the government 
must rely on experts from outside the govern-
ment, and most often, from outside the public 
research institutions.
The data focuses on the preparation net-
works of a single policy programme. The docu-
ment is the Helsinki Ecological Sustainability 
Programme for 2005–2008. The programme 
included policy measures for all sectors of soci-
ety within the scope of the city’s actions, as well 
as the offi cial, binding environmental policy for 
Helsinki. Thus, it should be considered the single 
most important defi ning document of environ-
mental public action in the capital of Finland. 
Yet, given the instruments and measures chosen 
for the policy, it should not be taken as an 
example of environmental policy trumping other 
policy issues — especially economic policy. 
Still, an overview of the process is interesting 
as it serves to exemplify collective decision-
making in the context of the local environment.
The next chapters describe the collective 
decision-making process and its focal points 
through the issues raised by the theory of govern-
ance. Firstly, the pluricentric nature of modern 
policy and the motives behind this develop-
ment are discussed, followed by the process of 
delegating of responsibility to multiple actors, 
which necessitates network building. The struc-
tures of the organizational communication net-
work have important effects on the fi nal policy 
choice. A networked decision-making process, 
however, does not imply equal importance of 
all the actors involved, and the networks are 
more than a simple membership structure. It is 
a highly complex structure, resulting from the 
individual decisions of the actors involved. I 
highlight this through the concept of issue areas 
within environmental policy. The policy process 
is then depicted as a complex, open-ended proc-
ess, where the mobilization of expertise is more 
important than power struggles.
Material and methods
Background
Helsinki is the capital of Finland with a popula-
tion of 570 000 inhabitants in the municipality 
proper and 1 300 000 in the metropolitan area. 
The area accounts for a quarter of the popula-
tion and a third of the gross domestic product of 
Finland. The relative size of the area makes the 
local environmental policy important nationally, 
but Helsinki has posited itself as a leader and an 
example in the fi eld for other localities as well.
The analysis focuses on the policy process 
and communication networks in environmen-
tal policy-making in Helsinki. I concentrate on 
the process of drafting and preparing for the 
Helsinki Ecological Sustainability Programme 
(HESP), the main environmental policy docu-
ment for the city. What makes the programme 
especially appealing for analysis is the explicit 
networked nature of its preparation: not only 
were multiple organizations from both the public 
and the private spheres involved in the drafting 
of the document, they were explicitly called on 
to be involved by the central executive body of 
the city.
The policy process that resulted in the HESP 
policy started at the initiation of the City Board, 
the main executive body of the city organization. 
The goal was to build a Local Agenda for Sus-
tainability into the 21st century, as indicated by 
joining the Aalborg treaty (http://ec.europa.eu/
environment/urban/pdf/aalborg_charter.pdf) in 
1995. Based on the ideas of the United Nations’ 
sustainability agenda, a group of European cities 
started to put together agendas for sustainable 
cities. The initiative resulted in the process lead-
ing to the Helsinki Action Plan for Sustainability. 
The agenda does not defi ne concrete measures 
or instruments, but rather goals that should be 
attained for Helsinki to achieve sustainability. 
Thus, the HESP was needed for the Action Plan 
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to be put into effect. However, the goals of sus-
tainability shifted considerably as the original 
mission statement given by the City Board, to 
the Action Plan, and then into the HESP (Fig. 1). 
My aim here is to demonstrate how the structure 
of the network in the preparation process of the 
HESP was instrumental in motivating these dif-
ferences, and in the weight given to the various 
issue areas as measured by the number of instru-
ment choices.
The difference between the goals is mostly 
in emphasis. The various goals do not contradict 
each other, and all can be understood within 
the framework of sustainable cities in general. 
Still, the move from the politically motivated 
goals (i.e. sustainable suburbs) in the document 
provided by the City Board to the more general 
goals in the Action Plan with citizen involve-
ment, as well as on the fairly technical goals in 
the HESP, is informative. In governance, the role 
of the elected executive is as much managerial 
as it is political. The complexity of the policy 
issues means that no single body is able to make 
effi cient decisions, and the role of the public 
bodies is that of a network manager (Klijn and 
Koppenjan 2000).
The programme had been approved in 2005, 
and the policies included were to be executed 
between 2005 and 2008. The policy agenda was 
to be based on the earlier local sustainability 
agenda, but focusing on ecological sustainability 
and the technical implementation of the goals set 
therein. The draft process began in early 2003, 
so the policy formulation phase lasted over two 
years. During this time, the goals of the policy 
process changed slightly, but it still managed to 
produce a fairly coherent policy document. The 
HESP includes the shorter, offi cial environmen-
tal policy for Helsinki, which was approved by 
the city council, and the longer, executive part 
defi ning the relevant themes and objectives as 
well as concrete measures for the programme. 
The whole document was approved by the City 
Board, who stipulated that it should serve as a 
guideline in all actions taken by city agencies.
Data
Data on the policy process is based on adminis-
trative documents and in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews with organizational representatives 
of the organizations involved. The documents 
included are mostly preceding policy docu-
ments and various minutes and proceedings from 
meetings concerning the issue (examples of the 
most signifi cant ones are listed in Table 1). The 
choice of organizations to be included in the data 
was based on listings of organizations involved 
in recent Helsinki Environmental Policy Pro-
grammes. The list is assumed to include most of 
the organizations with an interest in the process, 
Sustainable suburbs
Measuring
sustainability
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City Board Mission
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Fig. 1. The themes of 
sustainable development 
as indicated by the major 
policy documents.
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but any organization that was not allowed or did 
not wish to participate in the offi cial preparatory 
processes is excluded. The assumption should 
not be overly problematic, as the process was 
fairly open to anyone wishing to collaborate, and 
there is no strong controversy in local environ-
mental policies that would make a group or type 
of organization opt out. The data includes politi-
cal, administrative, non-governmental non-profi t 
organizations as well as private corporations 
(Table 2).
The main body of the data is the communi-
cation network of the organizations. The inter-
views with the representatives of the organiza-
tions focused on the media, frequency, and type 
of communication to each of the other organiza-
tions. In policy negotiations, information sent 
through broadcast methods, i.e. media that make 
the communication available to all parties, is 
usually less infl uential than confi dent, pair-wise 
communication (Knoke 1990). Thus, the focus 
of the data is on communication directed at a 
single communication partner, or a small exclu-
sive group of partners, such as in a meeting. The 
communicating bodies are assumed to be the 
organizations, not the persons interviewed; this 
is obviously not an unproblematic assumption, 
but one that is usually made in political network 
research (Heinz et al. 1990). A single network 
based on the HESP policy process is used for 
most of the analysis.
The representatives interviewed were either 
general managers (i.e. CEOs, chairpersons) 
in the smaller organizations or environmen-
tal branch managers in the larger ones. Before 
the interview each interviewee was asked to 
recall all of their interorganizational collabora-
tion related to environmental policy, and when 
applicable bring any possible materials on this 
collaboration to the interview. The fi rst part of 
the interview was a discussion of the commu-
nication processes in general, while the second 
part focused on specifi c interactions. Since net-
work data based on free recall by interviewees 
has been found to have considerable memory 
bias issues (Marsden 2005), the questions were 
amended with memory prompts specifi c to each 
organization, based on public documents and 
previously completed interviews. The last part 
of the interview consisted of a discussion on 
the importance of the various environmental 
issues to the functioning of the organization. The 
interview questions were open-ended, but the 
answers were given a numerical coding for the 
analysis.
An important characteristic of policy is the 
open and dynamic nature of the decision-making 
Table 1. Examples of archival document sources used (see Jalonen 2002 for more information).
Document Year In force Description
 approved
1st Helsinki Environmental Programme 1990 1990–1994 Focus on traditional end-of-pipe
   measures
2nd Helsinki Environmental Programme 1994 1994–1998 Focus on sustainable development
3rd Helsinki Environmental Programme 1999 1999–2002 More specifi c; focus on issues
   within the jurisdiction of the city
The Helsinki Action Plan for Sustainability 2002  Local sustainability agenda, process
   open to all citizens
The Helsinki Ecological Sustainability Programme 2005 2005–2008 The main focus of the analysis; also
   the 4th environmental programme
HESP Follow-up study 2007
Table 2. Types of organizations included in the inter-
view data set.
Public
 Political (executive/legislative) 2
 Administrative 21
 City subsidiary 5
Private
 NGO — environmental focus 11
 NGO — local, citizen focus 14
 Interest group 11
 Company 14
Total 78
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processes. This is manifest in the structure of 
the HESP, as it cannot be considered in the 
traditional context of the policy process, where 
identifi cation of a problem is followed by the 
formulation of proposals for solving it, after 
which one is chosen, and (possibly) the effects 
of the chosen policy are later evaluated. In gov-
ernance processes, on the other hand, the policy 
issue is consistently redefi ned, the defi nition 
of the problem is part of the solution, and the 
implementation is part of the decision-making 
process, as the problem is not stable even after a 
decision is made.
This poses two problems for the data. First, 
the interview is necessarily only a slice in time 
in the changing process. Second, the slice in time 
the interviewee describes is already in the past, 
and his later knowledge has altered his view on 
the policy, but also on the drafting process. The 
fi rst issue could have been dealt through panel 
data, which was unattainable, as the interviewees 
would not agree to repeated in-depth interviews 
over extended periods of time. The second was 
ameliorated by completing the interviews rela-
tively soon after the process took place.
In general, the interviewees saw the draft 
process as an important infl uence on the policy 
process. Representatives of smaller organiza-
tions sometimes expressed frustration with the 
different possibilities of the organizations to act 
within the network. The analysis here points 
to the importance of network position, which 
could be the source of the frustration. However, 
most of the interviewees viewed the policy as 
very important for the organization, and thus 
expressed interest in the interviews and found it 
is easy to recall the details of prior events.
Methodology
The analysis was done using descriptive meth-
ods of social network analysis (Wasserman and 
Faust 1994), combined with the terminology 
and framework of the theory of governance. 
The focus was on the measures of centrality 
(Bonacich 1987, Borgatti 2005), the concept of 
structural holes (Burt 1992, 2000a, 2000b), and 
the clustering or the subgroup structures in the 
network (De Nooy et al. 2005). The analyses 
were completed using measures available in two 
program packages dedicated to social network 
analysis: Ucinet (Borgatti et al. 2004) and Pajek 
(Batagelj and Mrvar 2007).
The methods of social network analysis 
assume that actors are interdependent, that their 
interdependencies have effects on the transfers 
of both material and immaterial resources, and 
that the structure of the relationships resulting 
from the interdependencies shapes the effects 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994). A network is 
defi ned as a set of relations for a given set of 
actors. For political networks, the relations of 
interest are fl ows of resources (monetary sup-
port between organizations), as well as trust-
worthy, stable communication relations. Here, 
I use a single communication network for the 
analyses. As the data is based on both interviews 
and archival data, a cut-off point was used to 
determine the inclusion or exclusion of com-
munication links: as long as both interviewees 
mentioned having collaboration with the other, 
or one of the interviewees mentioned it and it 
was supported by archival records (i.e. the two 
organizations had representatives in the same 
key organization), the two organizations were 
deemed to have a communication relation.
The resulting network lists the relations 
between 78 organizations involved in the making 
of the Helsinki environmental policy. The den-
sity of the network, or the proportion of observed 
ties to the maximal number of (or the complete 
network), is 0.20. This is roughly in line with 
densities observed in other policy network stud-
ies (Laumann and Knoke 1987), and highlights 
the need for summarizing network measures 
in describing the network, as even in the fairly 
small 78-actor network this amounts to more 
than 600 hundred communication ties.
Centrality measures are used to summarize 
the positions of the actors through their prestige 
prominence. The four measures are: degree or 
simple centrality, closeness centrality, between-
ness centrality, and eigenvector centrality, both 
for single actors and groups of actors (Everett 
and Borgatti 2005). Degree centrality is simply 
the number of ties an actor has, or equivalently, 
the number of ties a group has to actors out-
side the group. While this very rough measure 
can serve as an index of popularity, the more 
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complex measures are more appropriate in the 
network, where infl uence does not necessarily 
have to be direct, and where indirect infl uence 
through brokers is also benefi cial. Closeness 
centrality is the sum of the lengths of the com-
munication paths from the actor to all other 
actors (Borgatti 2005). It is a measure of the 
differences between the actors’ ability to broad-
cast information to the whole network. In the 
policy-making context, closeness measures the 
ability to distribute uncontroversial or technical 
information. Betweenness, on the other hand, 
measures the number of times an actor is needed 
to relate messages in the network. For actor k, 
betweenness is defi ned as the share of times 
actor i needs actor k in order to reach actor j. In 
the political context, actors with high between-
ness can use their position to withhold informa-
tion, or to prioritize passing on information that 
is in accordance with their preference. Finally, 
eigenvector centrality differentiates the connec-
tions between the actors: not only is having con-
nections important, but having connections to 
other central actors is important. Taking the prin-
cipal eigenvector of the network matrix results 
in a count of all walks or unrestricted paths from 
actors, weighted inversely by length (Bonacich 
1972, Borgatti 2005). The measure is appropriate 
for forms of infl uence that can be repeated: for 
example, repeated infl uence can matter in chang-
ing one’s opinion, but repeating uncontroversial 
knowledge once already known has no further 
effect. Thus, this measure is probably the most 
effi cient for measuring infl uence over policy 
decisions, and is hereafter referred to as infl u-
ence centrality.
Structural holes are related to the betweenness 
centrality measure, but are even more focused on 
the possibilities of actors to play others against 
each other by controlling the fl ow of information. 
A structural hole is the missing link in a group of 
three actors, allowing the one in between to con-
trol all interactions between the other two. Gener-
alized over all possible triads, or groups of three, 
structural holes measure the aggregate structural 
constraint of an actor. In a variety of negotiation 
settings, a low structural constraint indicating 
multiple structural holes has been identifi ed as 
a factor contributing to negotiation success and 
social capital (Burt 2000b). I use the concept 
to explore the constraints on different types of 
actors in the network, as well as to compare the 
constraints in different subnetworks defi ned by 
issue area, and thus try to establish how much 
effect the constraint structure of the network has 
in policy negotiations.
Similarily, I explore the differences between 
issue areas through the concept of network cores. 
Cores are maximal subnetworks in which each 
actor has at least a given number of connec-
tions within the network; the required number is 
indicated by the parameter k, and the measure is 
called k-cores (De Nooy et al. 2005). In policy 
networks, cores are naturally formed around 
single issues, as actors with similar interests seek 
support from similar actors. Critical examina-
tions of politics often point to an overly infl u-
ential central clique; however, the k-cores are a 
different measure, as they can just as easily be 
relegated to the periphery of the whole network 
as given the role of a central actor.
The main interest of the analysis was to link 
the structural measures indicated above to the 
substantial policy. The descriptive summary of 
the network measures should shed light on the 
policy-making process from a different point of 
view. Because the policy process at hand, the 
making of the HESP document, did not involve 
the either-or or division-of-the-cake situations 
politics often does, it was not possible to link the 
measures to power, or even to the interests of the 
various organizations. It was more appropriate 
to focus on expertise and infl uence through that.
Results
Centrality measures
As discussed above, the aim of this paper is 
to demonstrate the exploration of a communi-
cation network structure using the methodol-
ogy developed in the fi eld of social network 
analysis. The four different centrality measures 
(Table 3) give a general overview of the build-
ing blocks of the communication structure. The 
raw degree distribution (Fig. 2) shows that a 
handful of organizations maintain connections 
to a majority of others. These organizations are 
mostly city administration representatives, who 
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are often also required to maintain collaboration 
by statute, at least within the city administration. 
However, the other centrality scores show that 
it might not be effi cient ot maintain heavy con-
nectedness or simple popularity, if organizations 
are seeking to use the network for broadcasting 
information, brokering negotiations, or infl uence 
attitudes. On the other centrality scores, the 
differences between those with the most con-
nections and those with considerably less are 
signifi cantly smaller.
Closeness centrality, standardized to vary 
between a minimum of 0 (for an organization that 
cannot reach all the other network participants at 
all) and a maximum of 1 (for an organization that 
is directly connected to all the other organiza-
tions), shows all organizations are fairly similar 
in their efforts they need to have their mes-
sage reach throughout the whole network. Close-
ness centrality scores are all within two standard 
deviations from the mean. Closeness is related 
to the diffusion of ideas (Scott 1992). Thus, the 
HESP network can be seen as egalitarian in the 
opportunities for advancement of policy ideas, 
if the degree distribution is used as a baseline. 
Also, the closeness scores point to low levels of 
polarization in the network. Unlike the images of 
policy-making, displayed it as a unidimensional 
left-right — struggle, the local environmental 
policy network has no great cleavage — not even 
between environmentalists and industry.
Betweenness centrality, on the other hand, 
emphasizes the importance of the central actors. 
The majority of the actors in the network have 
a betweenness score of zero, as they are not 
needed in the fl ow of information within the 
network. Yet, all the scores are low, the highest 
being 0.13 (with the theoretical maximum for a 
star-shaped network being one). The actors with 
the highest betweenness scores are representa-
tives of the administration, as should be expected 
based on the degree measure and its high cor-
relation with the betweenness scores (r = 0.879). 
Still, this emphasizes the coordinating role of the 
administration: instead of it being a top-down 
hierarchy, where political power is a result of 
formal status. Government actors, even within 
the framework of governance (Pierre and Peters 
2005) are signifi cant as coordinators or manag-
ers of the networked process.
The last of the centrality measures, eigenvec-
tor centrality or infl uence centrality, accounts 
for the differences in importance of one’s com-
munication partners. The more connected they 
are, the more they contribute to one’s potential 
infl uence infl uence potential in the network. It is 
probably the best of the measures for assessing 
the changed role of government in the process. 
It indicates that the formal organization has 
retained the most important role in the policy 
network. The political actors are all connected 
to each other, yet still form the center of the 
network, even if it can be diluted in cases of 
policy issue expertise concerns and the like. 
The infl uence centrality offers a more traditional 
look at the policy even within the private sector: 
the more important links are controlled by the 
interest groups, while other private bodies are 
less central. Still, all the scores are low: with a 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the centrality meas-
ures used.
Centrality Mean SD Min Max
measure
Degree 15.948 11.643 1 54
Betweenness 0.011 0.025 0.00 0.13
Closeness 0.550 0.065 0.418 0.67
Eigenvector 0.097 0.059 0.012 0.262
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Fig. 2. Distribution of number of communication links, 
degree, per organization.
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maximum of 0.262 with a theoretical maximum 
of one; the conclusion should be that the network 
remains open (Table 4).
The centrality measures together describe a 
highly connected network, where information 
can reach all actors quickly. Closeness does not 
vary greatly, implying that no areas, sectors, 
or groups are totally sidelined in the process. 
Regardless, some actors can maintain infl uential 
positions by appearing at all the important discus-
sions, and keeping up their positions as an inter-
mediaries. Theoretically, the results are best seen 
as an answer to the critics of governance theory 
(Peters and Pierre 1998), who base their criti-
cism on the inability of governance to account 
for the continuing importance of government. 
Indeed, some of the writers have emphasized the 
role of governing without government (Rhodes 
1996). An empirical approach to the policy net-
works observed can solve this dilemma by posing 
the importance of government as an empirically 
determined question. Here, the centrality meas-
ures display government agencies as the most 
important actors in the policy fi eld, even though 
private actors have gained infl uence and access to 
the decision-making process.
Structural holes
The concept of structural holes links the discus-
sion more closely to the ongoing debates on 
social capital (see Porter 1998 for a review). 
Structural holes are also related to the concept 
of weak ties (Granovetter 1973), the linkages 
between strong cohesive groups that end up being 
the most important ties in defi ning the social 
structure and its effects on micro-level behav-
iour. For a triad, or a group of three actors, the 
structural hole is easily defi ned as the position 
between two actors who need to communicate. 
For the whole network, I have used two meas-
ures to compare the aggregate constraint that the 
structural holes place on the organizations. Thus, 
the measure is calculated on the organization that 
is in the weaker position, not that benefi ting from 
the structural hole is benefi cial. The aggregate 
constraint measures vary between one, for an 
organization whose communications are totally 
controlled by a single alter organization, and zero, 
for an organization who does not need any par-
ticular other in the network for communication.
First, the aggregate constraint between types 
of organizations is calculated to continue the 
discussion of the position and importance of the 
state and private sectors in governance policy 
negotiations. Second, the constraint is linked 
to policy process effi ciency in issue areas: six 
subnetworks are separated from the original net-
work, based on the six themes under which the 
various policy instruments and measures are 
placed. The placement of each organization in 
the subnetworks is based on self-reported pri-
mary interest, leaving out the considerable over-
lap of the organizations in the network. Then, 
the aggregate constraint is calculated for each of 
these subnetworks. The link to policy output in 
the networks is made using a rough measure of 
policy instrument count in the group. The meas-
ure ignores the considerable differences between 
various policy instruments in their actual envi-
ronmental impact. Yet, as the impacts of policy 
in very different areas — greenhouse gas reduc-
tions and environmental education, for example 
Table 4. The average scores on the centrality measures by type of organization.
Type of Average Average Average Average
organization degree betweenness closeness eigenvector
Political 17.500 0.006 0.562 0.132
Administrative 25.285 0.026 0.602 0.149
City subsidiary 29.600 0.022 0.617 0.179
NGO — environmental focus 12.000 0.006 0.522 0.062
NGO — local. citizen focus 9.285 0.003 0.513 0.058
Interest group 11.636 0.004 0.531 0.076
Company 10.000 0.002 0.523 0.065
Total 15.948 0.011 0.550 0.097
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— are diffi cult to measure on the same scale, 
and since the main interest here is the impact of 
network structures on policy processes, the use 
of policy instrument count as a proxy for subnet-
work effi ciency should be justifi ed.
The aggregate constraint averages for the 
various types of organizations highlight slightly 
different features of the structure than the related 
centrality numbers (Table 5). Communication 
link building strategies that try to minimize 
the length of information chains may expose 
actors to structural holes. This is evident in the 
scores for environmentalist organizations, which 
are more central on all of the measures than 
the other non-governmental groups, but which 
are more constrained by their network position. 
As communication between organizations is a 
scarce resource, establishing a single arrowhead 
link to the original core of the network can 
appear to be a benefi cial strategy. From the 
point of view of negotiation theory, however, if 
structural holes are important bargaining chips 
in negotiations, it is simultaneously necessary to 
ensure that one’s strong, subgroup network ties 
do not employ a similar strategy. If this happens, 
the outcome of the network may give the central 
actor a position to play the other party against 
your own subgroup, instead of giving them the 
ability to use their connections with the network 
periphery as a negotiation weapon against the 
central organizations.
The social capital of a single organization 
can be assumed to be a function of the structural 
holes they can use (Nan et al. 2001). But from 
the perspective of the macro-level, or possibly 
the policy-maker or network manager, a higher 
constraint may result in a more effective net-
work structure. For example, the small world 
phenomena (Watts and Strogatz 1998), where 
even in extremely large networks, the number of 
communication links needed to send information 
to any point in the network can remain low, as 
long as the network is formed as a combination 
of tight clusters and random cross-network links. 
Such a network would include a high number of 
information hubs, which are able to heavily con-
strain others through intergroup structural holes. 
Similarly, for a policy network, hub actors can 
be hypothesized to control the fl ow of informa-
tion in the network, resulting in better utilization 
of the scarce time of all involved.
I have analyzed this using the six policy issue 
subnetworks and their products, the numerous 
policy measures produced by the HESP process. 
The differences in constraint are slightly smaller 
for the different subnetworks than for the types 
of actors (Table 6). The amount of constraint is 
lower for the subnetworks with a wide base of 
organizations from all different sectors of society, 
such as greenhouse gases, and higher for strictly 
professional subnetworks, such as ecological 
construction. Both private and public hubs are 
Table 6. The aggregate structural constraint in the HESP policy issue subnetworks and the number of policy instru-
ments produced by each subnetwork.
Policy issue subnetwork Avarage constraint SD No. of policy instruments
Greenhouse gases 0.1169 0.03396 7
Biodiversity 0.1299 0.05357 6
Urban planning 0.1716 0.06591 12
Ecological construction 0.1847 0.22980 12
City acquisitions 0.1512 0.02637 9
Environmental education 0.1323 0.02733 8
Total 0.1533 0.10944 54
Table 5. The aggragate structural constraint in the 
HESP network. Averages by organization type.
Type of organization Average SD
 constraint
Political  0.1199 0.02131
Administrative 0.1183 0.03837
City subsidiary 0.0959 0.01846
NGO — environmental focus 0.2124 0.26511
NGO — local. Citizen focus 0.1857 0.07259
Interest group 0.1520 0.04030
Company 0.1530 0.02103
Total 0.1533 0.10944
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able to place more constraint in these networks, 
where higher specialization can be expected to 
result in higher communication costs, as the rel-
evant policy information is more complex.
The result of the policy process seems to 
provide support for the hypothesis about the 
effi ciency of network control. Higher average 
constraint is associated with a higher number 
of policy measures for each of the subgroups 
— in fact, the Pearson correlation between sub-
group network constraint and the number of 
policy mearures associated with each subgroup 
is 0.942. The correlation coeffi cient itself obvi-
ously has little value in relation to six cases, but 
the strength of the association between network 
structure and policy instrument output can be 
qualitatively assessed as very high. The presence 
of brokering actors is necessary for the function-
ing of the network (Gould and Fernandez 1989).
Thus, the policy effects of structural holes 
appear to be almost contradictory from the point 
of view of a single organization, and of the net-
work as a whole. The struggle between infl uence 
and compromise has always been an important 
feature of policy networks (Laumann and Knoke 
1987). For an organization actively involved in 
policy processes, this is a necessary trade-off: 
the expertise of others cannot be mobilized with-
out granting them some infl uence in the proc-
ess. Powerful positions can still be maintained 
through the use and building of structural holes.
Network subgroups
The third part of the analysis focuses on sub-
groups with no exogenous defi nition occurring in 
the network itself, such as the issue areas used in 
the previous chapter. Smaller cohesive subgroups 
or cores are technically called k-cores, where k 
is the minimum number of connections required 
within the group for an actor to be included in 
the core. In a policy network, the issue of inter-
est is how these groups are formed. They can 
focus on a tight inner core, or they may support 
the hollow state hypothesis (Heinz et al. 1990). 
Alternatively, they may concentrate more on the 
issue areas themselves. As the formation of the 
HESP network was more or less voluntary for the 
organizations, it is interesting to see where the 
actors’ decisions resulted in clique-like structures.
The cores in the network start at the trivial 
1-core, where only a single tie is required for 
inclusion, and, for the HESP network, range to 
the highest observed core, the 13-core. The core 
structures may be nested or separate. If we focus 
on the higher-level structures and the different 
types of organizations in the network, three inter-
esting core structures appear (Table 7). The group 
of city administration and subsidiaries is the most 
connected. Communication within the city organi-
zation is often mandated, so the structure should 
be fairly unsurprising. Another core is formed of 
environmentalist non-governmental organizations 
and interest groups. The third core includes resi-
dents associations and private companies. These 
somewhat unexpected communication groups can 
be hypothesized as resulting from a difference in 
interest focus, if not a similarity of interests as 
such. The environmentalist/interest group core is 
more concerned with general issues, the residents/
companies core with local, specifi c issues. Even 
though the cores may form around struggling 
preferences, it is plausible that specifi c local plans 
are more important to the latter groups, and gen-
eral guidelines to the former.
Table 7. The largest cohesive subgroups in the HESP network and the member organizations by type.
 Type or organization
 
Core Political Administration City subsidiary NGO — env. NGO — local Interest group Company Total
09 0 1 0 2 5 2 8 18
10 0 4 0 5 1 4 0 14
11 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3
12 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 4
13 1 9 5 0 0 0 0 15
Total 2 21 5 11 14 11 14 78
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An analysis of the cores in comparison with 
the previously used six policy issue areas gives 
a similar picture of the policy cores in Helsinki 
environmental policy (Table 8). The highest level 
core and the administrative organizations are 
distributed evenly in all the issue areas — they 
were given the task of chairing the formal policy 
issue area negotiations. Two core structures were 
observed in the substance areas. The closeness 
of the issues biodiversity, urban planning, and 
environmental education is the fi rst structure; 
the second includes greenhouse gas, urban plan-
ning, and ecological construction. While there 
are obvious technical rationalizations for most 
of these pairings, the high activity of the urban 
planning and traffi c organizations is interesting. 
Planning is a very important part of city admin-
istration activities, and local policy. The role of 
urban planning organizations probably refl ects 
this: whatever the environmental policy issue is, 
the resolutions need to include planning.
No extreme core or a core versus a periphery 
structure was found in the analysis. Still, the cen-
tral administration has not lost its coordinating 
role in local environmental policy, at least not to 
the same degree as has federal policy making in 
the US (Laumann and Knoke 1987). The cohe-
sive subgroups observed are probably results of 
both administrative reasoning and substantial 
policy thinking.
Discussion
Modern policy processes are open, complex 
processes, in which simple explanations based 
on formal law and government do not aptly 
Table 8. The largest cohesive subgroups in the HESP network by predefi ned issue area.
 Policy Issue Networks
 
 Greenhouse Biodiversity Urban Ecological City Env. Total
Core gases  planning construction acquisitions education
09 5 0 5 8 0 1 19
10 0 4 5 0 0 4 13
11 0 0 0 0 2 1 3
12 1 0 0 2 0 1 4
13 4 1 1 3 4 2 15
Total 12 7 22 15 10 12 78
describe decision-making. Here, the attempt has 
been to employ numerical data and the methods 
of social network analysis for a more accu-
rate description of policy making The network 
summary was found to effi ciently capture the 
relevant features of policy decisions in Helsinki 
urban environmental governance. Centrality, 
structural holes and core-periphery structures 
effi ciently describe the network and explicitly 
link it to policy decisions.
The main fi nding is that dense and connected 
local networks, combined with sparse networks 
with information brokers enabling communica-
tion between network regions, are able to per-
form and produce the required policy instruments 
and documents. The Helsinki network acted as a 
mixture of a communication network and a nego-
tiation network. It neither searched for technical 
solutions nor divided a single, pre-determined 
prize. Even when the general goals of environ-
mental policy were agreed upon, the technical 
solutions themselves had a political aspect.
In modern governance, even outside the local 
sphere and the environmental focus, the situa-
tion is often similar. The goal-defi nition and the 
instrument selection cannot be separated. When 
this is tge case, the approach presented here 
should be fruitful, as the network composition 
can result from any type of interest. The Helsinki 
case was particularly fi tting for the analysis, 
as the network and the public–private relations 
were explicitly included in the programme. Still, 
the descriptive strength of the approach should 
be benefi cial as long as the goals and instruments 
of policy are interdependent.
The summary description of the decision-
making network made here should then be taken 
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as a step toward a comparative methodology of 
networked governance. The methodology should 
be the simplest feasible description of important 
network statistics. Such descriptions would be 
comparable over different institutional settings, 
even over different levels, if the defi nitions of 
the key terms — the actors and their ties — 
are suffi ciently generic. The networks, and more 
importantly their results, the policies, could be 
statistically analyzed, which would be necessary 
to uncover the mechanisms behind policy choice. 
The interplay between technical expertise that is 
needed to solve policy problems and the tradi-
tional infl uence or power in different policy sec-
tors would be a particularly interesting question.
The approach presented here could be par-
ticularly useful for comparative local govern-
ance research. At the local level, the institutions 
vary tremendously between countries and areas. 
So far, research has focused on the various insti-
tutional settings and the framework provided 
by governance has been interpreted differently 
in different settings (Eckerberg and Joas 2004). 
The network approach would, hopefully, be able 
to offer a comparison across institutional frame-
works, as it does not presuppose any particular 
structure.
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